Infographic: Foreign Involvement in Syria and Iraq

While the war in Syria started as a traditional civil war, in recent years it has taken on a very international dimension. A wide variety of international countries are overtly or covertly supporting their favored groups and sides in the conflict. As well, some nations are now using air power and even limited ground troops in order to swing the war in their favor. Combined with this conflict spilling over into Iraq in 2014, the situation is very complicated indeed. The infographic below seeks to make sense of the tangled web of alliances and military support in Syria and Iraq, between local fighting groups and outside countries. Within the infographic, light green indicates diplomatic support and dark green indicates direct military support. On the other hand, orange indicates diplomatic opposition, and red represents direct aggressive military action.

As well, it is important to note that this graphic shows official diplomatic and military support rather than covert operations or unofficial military support.

The Turkish ‘Invasion’ of Iraq

The involvement of Turkey in the war in Syria has been extensively covered, but now over the last week, it appears the country is also gearing up for a greater role in the neighbouring and connected war in Iraq. While talk of a Turkish ‘invasion’ of Iraq is somewhat overblown, the consequences of Turkish troops deploying to Iraq could have far-reaching geopolitical ramifications.

The current controversy between Iraq and Turkey began last week following the emergence of reports that Turkey had deployed a number of soldiers to Bashiqa, a small Peshmerga-held town around 15km away from the ISIS-controlled city of Mosul in northern Iraq. While initial reports of the number of troops varied, the most credible information now has around several hundred troops and up to 25 associated vehicles deployed.

What is not yet clear is the mandate of these troops, and the role they will play in Iraq. According to Turkish statements, "the mandate of the Turkish elements in Bashiqa is to provide training to Iraqi volunteers within the scope of the fight against Daesh, and they have not been given combat duties and responsibilities". Nonetheless many still believe these troops may play a larger, and more direct combat role against ISIS into the future.

Whatever role Turkey intends for these troops, what is more important is the international (and intranational in the case of Iraq) response to their deployment. The Iraqi government of Al-Abadi has widely condemned this as a breach of Iraq sovereignty, with his government giving several deadlines for the Turkish troops to withdraw, before they faced retaliation. These deadlines were backed up by similar threats from Shia militia groups within the Popular Mobilisation Units which form a significant part of the Iraqi forces.

While these deadlines and threats may indeed be serious, the fact that they have passed without incident stands testament to the fact that it is actually very difficult for Iraqi government forces to attack the Turkish troops. Notwithstanding their much more critical war with ISIS, the Iraqi government/Shia militias would also have to attack through territory controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

Given the good relations between Turkey and the KRG (in contrast to other Kurdish groups), and the fact that the Turkish deployment likely has the tacit approval of KRG leader Masoud Barzani, this is unlikely to happen without a fight. Furthermore, the relations between KRG Peshmerga forces and Shia militia have suffered a serious deterioration over recent months following clashes around the town of Tuz Khurmatu, making any deployments against Turkish forces likely to face Peshmerga resistance.

Shia militia form a large component of Iraq's armed forces.

With all of this considered, Turkey’s deployment will have several geopolitical ramifications. Firstly, the KRG will become more deeply aligned with Turkey due to their hosting of Turkish troops, as well as their own Peshmerga troops receiving Turkish training and support. Secondly, the Iraqi government may be forced to align itself more with Russia, as the US is unable to prevent the erosion its of sovereignty by another NATO player. In the long-run these positions could serve to solidify a formal partition of Iraq following the defeat of ISIS as a major military force in the country.

The Battle to Retake Ramadi from ISIS

The city of Ramadi, Iraq was captured by ISIS in May this year. After encroaching on the city from several directions, the militant group managed to rout Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and inflict heavy casualties. In the time since this initial capture however, the Islamic State’s position within the city has become shakier. Following a counter attack by ISF and Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU), the tables have been turned and now it is Iraqi forces which surround Ramadi, and are encroaching from several directions. Currently it is unclear if ISIS still has the ability to move supplies and fighters into or out of the city via the Euphrates River, however it is estimated that between 600-1000 ISIS fighters remain in the urban area.

Ramadi Map, 2015-11-25 (details here https://t.co/ReVY10Xzlv ) pic.twitter.com/uRFfatB1uB

— Naenil (@Naenil) November 26, 2015

In the last week, Iraqi forces have announced their intention of recapturing the city in one final push. They have warned civilians to evacuate ISIS-held areas, promising them a security corridor in the south of the city. Reports from civilians still inside however indicate that ISIS is preventing them from leaving, instead preferring to keep them as human shields.

While the ISF and PMU forces have large amounts of equipment at their disposal, including US-built M1 Abrams tanks and backing from Coalition air strikes, they will undoubtedly face stiff resistance. ISIS has reported created vast minefields of IEDs, and similar to their tactics elsewhere, will deploy a large number of suicidal VBIED (vehicle-born IED) counter-attacks.

ISIS’s Propaganda Attacks Go Global

This is Part 2 of a 2-part series on ISIS’s strategic evolution. Part 1 can be read here. 

In the past month, ISIS, in collaboration with its regional affiliates has killed at least 400 civilians in a series of major attacks. On October 31, the group’s Sinai Province bombed a Russian passenger jet flying from Sharm el-Sheikh to St. Petersburg, killing 224. Then on November 10, a series of suicide bombers targeted a Shia neighborhood of Beirut killing at least 43. Finally on November 13, nine attackers conducted a Mumbai-style assault on several regions around Paris, killing at least 129 people.

Such attacks are both unprecedented in terms of scope and scale. So how do they fit into what we know about ISIS’s strategy of continuous theater-based offense?

The simple answer is they don’t. Rather, they prove that the group’s baseline strategy of responding to military defeats with counterattacks elsewhere in Syria and Iraq is no longer viable.

Recent defeats have shown that the militant group has reached a limit in its ability to mount counterattacks. Notwithstanding a theater-wide Tet-style offensive in Iraq or Syria, the forces arrayed against ISIS are now too large in number, and too well organised to suffer new, large-scale losses of land. So instead, in order to maintain an air of invincibility, and gain a propaganda victory, the group is now engaging in spectacular international attacks.

The Far Enemy

Into the future, fresh ISIS offensives in Syria and Iraq are possible, if not probable, but are unlikely to have the same effect as those in the past. Furthermore, the rate of these offensives and their size will continue to decline as the group begins to feel the bite of continuous attrition from air-strikes and failed attacks. With the territory controlled by ISIS now in decline, the group is shifting more and more towards hitting soft international targets. This regression is in many ways similar to the focus Al Qaeda put on attacking the 'far enemy' (USA) over the 'near enemy' (Muslim countries) following the First Gulf War.

From a Western (and Russian) perspective, this is critically dangerous. With border security compromised due to large-scale arrival of refugees - the vast majority of which are legitimately fleeing the worsening regional conflict - security services have their work cut out for them. France alone has stated that it has a list of at least 10,000 “potential terror suspects”. Within such an environment, further attacks on soft targets are all but inevitable.

BREAKING: #Putin orders Def Min to co-operate with French naval group in #Syria as allies - @RT_com pic.twitter.com/sDYISLuwN9

— Conflict News (@Conflicts) November 17, 2015

However, with each successive attack which ISIS carries out, they will also increase the number of foreign nations intent on destroying their core territories in Syria and Iraq. Already there is talk of a possible alliance between Russia and France, the two nations who have suffered the most from this recent wave of international terrorism, in order to defeat ISIS in Syria. With this taken into consideration, these attacks, while horrifying from a security perspective, also represent the beginning of the end of ISIS as a conventional military threat.

Obviously, the defeat of ISIS’s conventional forces will not solve the root problems that lead to the group’s rise in the first place. But rather it will give international players and local partners the space to implement reconstruction and educational projects, in order to restore some level of order to the regions formerly occupied by the group. Should these steps not be taken, a tactically different ISIS will continue to wage an insurgency in the region, as well as presenting a continuing international threat.

Why Is ISIS So Bad At Defense?

This is part 1 of a 2 part series on the strategic evolution of ISIS. Last week, despite the headlines focusing on the Paris attack, ISIS suffered yet another serious defeat, this time in Sinjar, an Iraqi town which sits astride a major highway linking Raqqa and Mosul. A combined force of Kurdish Peshmerga, PKK and Ezidi militia commenced a massive assault on the city on November 13. Just over 24 hours later, at 10:20 local time, these forces entered the town, and rapidly captured all areas, facing only token ISIS resistance.

This defeat, which will severely limit the group’s ability to transfer materiel and fighters between its Syrian and Iraqi provinces, is just the latest in a string of losses for the group. Recent months have seen the so-called Caliphate lose control of the city of Baiji, the area surrounding Ramadi, as well as significant territory in Southern Aleppo. This is all despite the fact that ISIS, by all accounts maintains a large fighting force, which should be able (on paper) to offer greater levels of resistance, especially when defending urban or semi-urban areas.

With this considered, the question needs to be asked – why is ISIS so bad at defense?

Evolution and expansionism

One answer to this question comes in the way in which ISIS rose to power in large portions of Syria and Iraq. Following the collapse of the Syrian state in 2012, ISIS began to enter Syria, and rapidly began consolidating its presence in what were then ‘rebel-held’ areas. Over the course of the next year or so, through aggression, subversion and coercion, ISIS grew to dominate power structures in the west of Syria.

From this power base, the group engaged on a series of highly successful offensive operations. First in Syria, they captured almost the full length of the Euphrates River, driving out Kurdish, and moderate rebel forces. Then, they struck Iraq, taking advantage of internal instability to take control of Fallujah in early 2014, and then shocking the world with the capture of much of northern Iraq, including Mosul and Tikrit in June 2014. Finally, despite increased resistance and coalition airstrikes, the group managed to capture Ramadi and Palmyra in early 2015.

This history of victorious offensives used to expand their nascent ‘state’ likely cemented the idea in the militant group’s leadership that offensive operations were key to victory, while neglecting static defense.

A ISIS SVBIED targets a Syrian regime position in Deir Ez Zour.

Defensive offensives

Through this experience of continuously spearheading offensives, ISIS developed a strategy whereby defending territory was replaced with a different tactic altogether. Should an area come under serious attack, the group would merely try to stall the advance of the force with IEDs and a small number of near-suicidal troops, before mounting counteroffensives elsewhere.

Instead of committing seriously to defense, past battles have shown that ISIS prefers to keep the majority of its troops on reserve, and then mount counter-offensives against softer targets, taking advantage of the fact that their enemies concentrated their forces at the first point of attack. In this way, when attacked and defeated at point A, ISIS would counterattack at points B and C.

This kind of strategy has worked for ISIS several times over the past years. The most obvious example of this was following the defeats of ISIS in Kobane and Tikrit, the group launched simultaneous offensives against Palmyra and Ramadi. As well, the Iraqi city of Baiji has switched hands several times now between ISIS and government forces with ISIS mounting counter offensives only when opposing troops have been redeployed elsewhere in the theater.

Finally, ISIS not only implements these tactics on a theater-wide scale, but also on a more tactical level. Before assaulting a position, ISIS usually makes a number of small probing raids which despite causing losses for the group, helps them find and target weak spots in their opposition's defense. From there they mount a massive attack using VBIEDs, AFVs and infantry, as seen during the battles for Ramadi, North Aleppo and Palmyra.

Nonetheless, ISIS continues to lose ground across its core regions, proving that this strategy, while successful in the past is now a failing one. In part two of this article, released tomorrow, a new and dangerous ISIS strategy can seen to be emerging, which is turning it into a more global threat, while at the same time hastening its demise.

US Special Forces Assist in Saving Hostages at the Request of KRG

Early this morning, US Special Forces supported a Iraqi Peshmerga operation to save hostages at an ISIS prison near Hawijah, Iraq. 69 hostages in total were rescued, including more than 20 members of the Iraqi Security Forces. Five ISIS members were detained by Iraqi forces, and a number of them were killed. The Pentagon also told reporters that the US gathered “important intelligence” on ISIS during the operation. One American soldier was killed, and three Directorate General of Counterterrorism personnel--part of the Kurdish Region Security Council (KRSC)--were injured. Initial reports of the operation reported that the hostages saved were Kurdish, but an official statement by the KRSC states that there were “no Kurds among the rescued hostages.”

KRG statement on #Pesh/#US raid on #ISIS. 69 rescued, 3 Pesh wounded, 1 US soldier dead, 20 ISIS dead - @cahitstorm pic.twitter.com/ZjG5rh57uS

— Conflict News (@Conflicts) October 22, 2015

A Pentagon press brief on the operation also underscored the fact that no Kurds were among the hostages that were rescued. Rather, most were Iraqi Arabs.

US officials: most of rescued hostages in Iraq from US SOF mission were Iraqi Arabs, not Kurdish

— Barbara Starr (@barbarastarrcnn) October 22, 2015

ISIS Media also confirmed that the the prison raid occurred, but said that the mission was a failure due to the fact that no Iraqi Peshmerga were freed.

#ISIS confirms the #US/#Peshmerga raid in Hawijah. Says it failed. “No Peshmerga fighters freed” - @zaidbenjamin pic.twitter.com/3rnJd7pkxt

— Conflict News (@Conflicts) October 22, 2015

The situation gets more interesting when examining the reason for US involvement in this particular operation. A statement released by the Pentagon regarding the operation explicitly states that US support came “at the request of the Kurdistan Regional Government.”

The statement went on to say that the hostages were in immediate danger, and US involvement in the operation, which included helicopter and troop assistance to Peshmerga forces, was consistent with current US counter-ISIS policies.

This operation was deliberately planned and launched after receiving information that the hostages faced imminent mass execution. It was authorized consistent with our counter-ISIL effort to train, advise, and assist Iraqi forces.

While it is fairly well known that the US and Kurdish forces are close allies in the fight against ISIS, the involvement of Special Ops forces in the field, or “boots on the ground,” is a seemingly sharp departure of current US anti-ISIS activity. Only time will tell if this signals an increased involvement for US forces, or an even tighter bond between the US and Kurds in the region.

Follow Conflict News on Twitter (@Conflicts) for more updates on this developing story.

Turkey’s PKK Fight Spirals Out Of Control

Over the course of the last week, the Turkish military and police forces have found themselves coming under increasingly deadly attacks by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). As well as continuing assassinations, gun, and missile attacks on their positions in Turkish Kurdistan, security forces are taking severe losses from the same technology which caused havoc for Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan: IEDs. On the 6th of September, two Turkish Army armoured vehicles were attacked by a PKK roadside bomb in Daglica, a remove village close to the southern border with Turkey. While the details of the incident are not yet fully clear, what is confirmed is that at least 16 Turkish soldiers were left dead (the PKK claims a higher toll) and several vehicles were destroyed. In response, the Turkish Air Force conducted massive air raids comprised of least 50 aircraft targeting PKK camps in Northern Iraq.

This massive aerial response however does not seem to have impacted the PKK’s operational capabilities or indeed its will to fight, for it was followed by yet another bloody day for Turkey. This morning, 12 police were killed and 4 more injured when their bus stuck an IED in the country’s north-eastern province of Iğdır. Then, this afternoon, news emerged of another PKK attack, this time in the southern city of Cizre, where 3 more police were killed in an RPG attack.

With airstrikes not enough to dislodge the PKK, the Turkish military then made decision to strike back against the militants and send ground forces across the border into Iraq. Reports emerged in the wake of today’s attacks that the Turkish Army had sent a battalion of at least 1000 troops and vehicles into Iraq in order to “pursue” PKK attackers.

This amounts to a large-scale escalation of the conflict and represents a further undermining of the sovereignty of Iraq, already weakened by the advance of ISIS. This being said, it is not unprecedented, with a similar incursion being undertaken by Turkey in 2008. Drawing a parallel with this event, it seems unlikely that Turkey’s armed forces will be able to uproot the PKK from this region, and indeed this cross-border attack may serve to even further inflame the fighting.

The nature of the PKK and the terrain in which it fights gives it a massive advantage over time. Distributed across tens of thousands of sq. km of mountainous terrain, their fighters are able to rely on guerrilla tactics, picking when and where to fight Turkey’s military. As well, many PKK fighters are battle hardened through years fighting both Turkey as well as ISIS, while many within the Turkish military are young conscripts with understandably low morale.

Giving that these are not difficult observations, thought needs to be put into why Turkey has even chosen to fight the PKK at this stage?

To answer this question, one only needs to take a look at the political situation within Turkey. In the recent general elections incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his AK Party (AKP) failed to gain the necessary 50% it needed to form a majority government. Instead, the pro-Kurdish HDP performed surprisingly well, blocking the AKP’s chances, and forcing a number of rounds of (failed) coalition government negotiations.

Seeing the writing on the wall and imminent snap elections, Erdogan likely believes that through a resumption of hostilities with the PKK, he can gain politically. AKP supporters have ramped-up allegations that the HDP is a political wing of the PKK and state-run media has become increasingly hostile towards the party. By linking it with the PKK who are very unpopular in the majority of Turkey, Erdogan hopes that he can reduce the HDP vote in upcoming elections to below the 10% threshold needed to enter parliament, and thus lead the AKP to a majority victory.

Nonetheless, if polling is to be believed the HDP has not seen a significant fall in support within Turkey, meaning that Erdogan is playing a very dangerous game politically and with the lives of his soldiers. This conflict with the PKK is continuing to escalate and the body count climbs higher with each passing day. He can either decide to de-escalate with the PKK and return attempt to return to earlier peace talks or he can continue to up the ante with addition cross border attacks and a further crackdown in Kurdish areas of Turkey, in an attempt to intimidate potential HDP voters.

Both strategies are incredibly risky from a domestic politics and regional security standpoint. All eyes will be on Erdogan and the AKP for what stance they take in the run up to snap elections called for Novemeber 1. Unlike most conflicts however, this latest PKK-Turkey struggle will not revolve around the success and failure of a military campaign, but rather an electoral one.

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Why Tactically Useless IRAMs Are So Popular in Iraq and Syria

The ongoing wars in Syria and Iraq are probably the most bloody and violent conflicts on the planet in 2015. While they have no shortage of conventional, mass produced weaponry, almost every side in this interlinked conflict also fields a massive variety of homemade, improvised weapons. Of these, none has seen greater proliferation this year, than the IRAM (Improvised Rocket Assisted Mortar). These improvised rockets are seen all the way from Daraa in the south of Syria, to the Kurdish areas in the north of Iraq. Indeed, just as these weapons are used in a great number of locations, they also come in a variety of shapes and sizes. This being said, almost all conform to a general design philosophy.

In this, a small diameter rocket (often a surplus Katyusha or Grad rocket) is attached to a much larger diameter warhead. This warhead is filled with TNT or other homemade explosives such as ANFO, and sealed within a barrel-like steel casing. In some cases these warheads are fitted with impact trigger fuses, while in other cases, they implement time-delay fuses.

A rough design of a rudimentary IRAM can be seen below:

A quick glance at this design is enough to infer that these rockets are not at all aerodynamic. The large explosive charge they hold significantly amplifies their destructive power, but it comes at a cost – IRAMs are short range, and highly inaccurate. Videos, such as the one below show that these rockets ‘tumble’ through the air making it basically impossible to reliably aim them.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8LiiDjzyj6M

So given that these rockets are so difficult to use, and obviously time consuming to make, why do groups persist in using them? Indeed, even other improvised weapons, such as the Syrian rebel’s infamous ‘Hell Cannon’ are much more effective and reusable than these weapons.

While there is no easy answer to this question, there are a number of reasons that groups are persisting in using these (seemingly) useless weapons. The first of these is the nature of the battlefield in Iraq and Syria. Rather than fighting at long ranges, most of the combat occurs between static positions in urban environments. These kinds of fights favour weapons which have massive destructive power, as opposed to long range or mobility. Furthermore, the random nature of these weapons also has a demoralising effect, giving soldiers on the other side the feeling that they could be hit anywhere, anytime.

Another plausible reason for the construction of IRAMs within this region is a possible surplus of artillery rockets without their normal warheads. In an event that a rebel group (or pro-Government militia) found themselves in possession of a large number of Grad rocket motors, but not their regular warheads, it would be prudent of them to cannibalise their rockets into further IRAM production.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VnIO_fsHBQU

One final reason for the proliferation of these rockets could be that the weapons represent the fingerprints of Iran on these conflicts. Tellingly, the first groups to use IRAMs in the Middle East were the Shia militia backed by Iran during the Iraq War. Then similar weapons, dubbed Volcano (Burkan) Rockets began to be seen used by the Syrian Regime, likely either supplied by Iran or built with Iranian assistance. From there, the Syrian rebel groups may have copied the designs for these weapons from those that they captured. Indeed, many rumours persist that the largest of the IRAMs seen in Syria – the so-called ‘Elephant Rockets’ are not even produced in Syria at all, but rather in Iran.

The exact reason why Iran favours supplying its proxy militias and aligned militaries with these weapons is unknown, however one answer seems likely. As these weapons are so simple and relatively easy to make, they give the country the ability to maintain plausible deniability.

As the conflict grinds on, we are likely to see a continued evolution in the tactics and weaponry used by each group. It may be that as conditions on the battlefield change, or different foreign suppliers get it involved, IRAMs slowly disappear from use. This being said, the current trend in 2015 is towards a further broadening of the use of these weapons into the future.

The Insane Improvised Weapons of Syria & Iraq

The war in Syria and Iraq is currently the largest being fought on the planet. While both countries are awash with former Soviet heavy weapons, as well as US small arms and Chinese imports, some of the most interesting weapons being used are completely improvised. These homemade weapons are unreliable, deadly, terrifying and in many cases completely insane. Elephant Rockets

Users: Assad Regime, Rebels

Military Effectiveness: Moderate

Propaganda/Fear Value: Low

The ‘Elephant’ Rocket is an IRAM (Improvised Rocket Assisted Munition) that was originally used by the Assad regime. Called as such due to the elephant-like sound made during launch, these rockets are made by attaching artillery rocket motors (such as B-21 Grad ammunition) onto much larger bombs. While this causes the rocket to lose accuracy and most of its range, it greatly increases its destructive potential. In many regions of Syria where the frontlines are only hundreds of meters apart, this weapon is particularly useful. Recognising this, similar rockets have begun to be produced by rebel units this year.

Armored SVBIEDs

Users: Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIS

Military Effectiveness: High

Propaganda/Fear Value: High

SVBIEDs (Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices) also known as car/truck bombs are not unique to the conflict engulfing Syria and Iraq, however, the fighting has seen significant innovation in their designs. Islamist terrorist groups, particularly the Islamic State group have become adept at taking civilian or military vehicles, and then adding truly ridiculous amounts of steel plate armor to them, before attempting to drive them towards enemy positions. Such attacks are often used preceding infantry assaults on positions, and feature heavily in ISIS propaganda.

Homemade Anti-Material Rifles

Users: Syrian Rebels

Military Effectiveness: Moderate

Propaganda/Fear Value: Low

In many areas of Syria, especially the urban battlefields of Aleppo, the fighting has ground down to a war of snipers. While ordinary sniper rifles are deadly enough, several rebel groups have begun to manufacture their own homemade anti-material rifles. Often based on recycled cannons and recoilless rifles, these weapons fire .50 caliber ammunition which has the ability to puncture walls and vehicle armor. While they are not enough to turn the tide of the battles, they nonetheless have proven to be a deadly addition to the rebels’ arsenal.

Improvised Tanks

Users: YPG, ISIS

Military Effectiveness: Low

Propaganda/Fear Value: Moderate

Until a few months ago, the Kurdish YPG forces in northern Syria had very few armored vehicles to protect the areas under their control. In order to make up for this gap, the YPG built several Mad Max style improvised tanks, often built by adding plate armor to a tractor motor. Unfortunately, these vehicles proved to be of little military utility due to slow speed, and armor easy penetrated by RPGs and heavy machine guns. Most were destroyed or captured by ISIS during the Battle of Kobane.

Chlorine Bombs

Users: Assad Regime, ISIS

Military Effectiveness: Low

Propaganda/Fear Value: High

While the regime of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad has officially given up all of its chemical weapons production, it still has one weapon up its sleeve. Chlorine - first used in the trenches of WWI - has reappeared in Syria, dropped from helicopters in the form of improvised barrel bombs. Despite the fact that these weapons are actually less deadly than similar bombs filled with high explosive, the SAA has continued to use them due to their value as weapons of fear able to terrorize rebel-held areas. In addition, there have been reports of ISIS using similar weapons propelled by rockets, or in IEDs in order to demoralise its enemies.

Tunnel Bombs

Users: Islamic Front, Jabhat al-Nusra

Military Effectiveness: Moderate

Propaganda/Fear Value: High

Another WWI-era tactic which has reappeared on the battlefields of Syria and Iraq is the tunnel bomb. Syrian rebel groups (especially the Islamic Front) spend weeks, if not months tunnelling deep under a regime strong point, then fill the tunnel with tons of high explosive. These are then detonated in massive explosions, obliterating buildings, and laying the groundwork for infantry advances. Most recently, 3 tunnel bombs were detonated simultaneously in Aleppo, in one of the most spectacular pieces of imagery of the entire war.

Tikrit: Winning the Battle, But Losing The War

In mid 2014, during the rapid advance of ISIS across northern Iraq, one of the group’s largest prizes was the capture of the city of Tikrit, the hometown of former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. On June 11, ISIS fighters working with former Baath party elements from the Naqshbandi Army captured the city with only minimal fighting. Along with the city itself, ISIS also managed to capture at least 1000 Iraqi Security Force cadets from the nearby military base called “Camp Speicher”. These prisoners were then executed, in one of the largest mass killings by the terrorist group to date. Now, 9 months later, the situation is altogether different. Months of Coalition airstrikes have massively degraded ISIS’s capabilities in the region, and Iranian military support has enabled the Iraqi military to get back on its feet and begin fighting back against ISIS. After half a year of just holding ISIS off, they have decided to go on the offensive in Tikrit.